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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
VANCE MORRIS,
Case No. 20080497-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) provides this Court’s jurisdiction over this
appeal in a criminal case involving convictions less than first degree felonies from a court
of record.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying Morris’ motion to suppress?
The factual findings underlying a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to
suppress are viewed under a clearly erroneous standard and the trial court’s conclusions
of law based on such facts are reviewed under a correctness standard, with no deference
to the trial court’s legal conclusions. Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ¶ 8,
994 P.2d 1283; State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
This issue was raised and ruled on in the trial court (e.g., R. 24-47, 59-66, 67-71).

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The controlling constitutional provisions and statutes are copied in the addendum
to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Morris by information with possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, driving under the influence, possession of paraphernalia, and
open container (R. 1-3). Following the preliminary hearing, Magistrate Lyle R. Anderson
ordered Morris bound over as charged (R. 16).
Morris moved to suppress evidence resulting from the illegal traffic stop and
Morris’ detention and arrest (R. 24-47, 59-66). Judge Anderson denied the motion to
suppress (R. 67-70).
Morris entered conditional guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute and possession of paraphernalia (R. 72-79), expressly preserving
his right to appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress (R. 76; R.87: 10).
Judge Anderson sentenced Morris to concurrent suspended terms of one to fifteen
years in prison and six months in jail (R. 108-111). The court issued a certificate of
probable cause, staying the probationary jail sentence pending resolution of the appeal
from the denial of the motion to suppress (R. 105-06, 114).
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Morris filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 101).

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL

THE STOP, DETENTION AND DE FACTO ARREST
Trooper Williams testified that on June 12, 2007, at about 9:40 to 9:45 p.m., he
initiated a stop on a black, Mazda Navajo SUV (R. 11:6, 14). Vance Morris was the
driver and Brenda Balsley was the passenger (R. 11:6, 7). Morris’s mother, Lola Mucky,
was the registered owner of the SUV (R. 11:30).
Trooper Williams testified that he made the stop for lack of a license plate, and
after observing the SUV “swerving within its lane,” “constantly bumping the fog line and
the center line,” and “cross[ing] the fog line a couple of times” but not by much (R. 11:6,
16).
The concern about lack of a plate was dispelled before Trooper Williams got out
of his own car to speak with the occupants of the SUV. He testified that as he walked up
to the SUV, he noticed there was a temporary sticker in the upper left hand corner of the
back window that was previously not visible because of the angle of the trooper’s
headlights did not reach the tag on the tall SUV, which had tint on the window. (R. 11:7,
18-19). The videotape actually demonstrates that it was after he initiated the stop, but
before the trooper ever stopped driving that he spotlighted the registration tag in the upper
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rear window on the back of the SUV (Video: 21:34:25).1
Examination of the evidence confirms that Morris’s driving was likewise lawful.
Trooper Williams turned on his car camera to record the driving pattern before he
activated his emergency lights (R. 11:17). He testified that he had watched the video and
that it shows the SUV “bumping or crossing the fog line.” (R. 11:17-18). Counsel
requests that the Court watch the video because it shows that Morris’s SUV did not cross
the fog line (Video 21:31:48 - 21:34:20). Instead, it shows Morris’s tall SUV with
something tied on the top of it driving within the allotted area between the center and fog
lines for over two minutes while trooper was driving behind him. When cars came in the
opposite direction, Morris pulled over toward but not across the fog line – a maneuver
safe drivers would make to avoid head-on collisions at night on this dark, narrow, rutted,
curving, two lane highway, where cars travel at a high rate of speed in opposite directions
in directly adjacent lanes. See Video at 21:31:48-21:34:20. Trooper Williams
acknowledged that the road Mr. Morris was traveling on “has some curves in it and there
are some straight points as well.” (R. 11:24). The videotape confirms that the road
curves periodically, and is rutted and filled with seams where road repairs have been
made.
The trooper did not write in his narrative report, in his DUI report form or in any
report that the SUV crossed the fog line (R. 11:15-16). Trooper Williams testified that he

1

A CD of the traffic stop is in the pleadings file, attached to R. 41.
4

told Morris that he “had seen him swerving back and forth in the lane” (R. 11:18-19) or
that he stopped him for swerving, “bumping the line” and crossing it a couple of times
(PH 26). By reviewing the videotape, the Court may confirm that Williams did not tell
Morris that he had crossed the fog line. Rather, he told him that he had been bumping it,
especially when other cars were passing (Video at 21:34:44). Morris responded to the
effect that the road was rutted and that one of his rear tires was low, and the trooper
accepted this explanation without any dispute or investigation, answering “Okay.”
(Video at 21:35:13).
The citation he issued does not charge improper lane travel or lack of a visible
plate, but only charged DUI (R. 11: 9, R, 27).
The DUI report form indicates that Morris’ speech was slurred. The videotape is
important to review in this regard, because it captures Morris’ clear enunciation, and
rational and respectful conversation and course of conduct with the trooper. He pulled
over when signaled to do so, immediately offered to produce his license and registration,
and was fully compliant throughout the entire prolonged encounter. See videotape.
In the DUI report form, the trooper indicated that Morris’s eyes were “glassy,” a
condition or eye color which is often alleged by Utah police officers in DUI cases,2 but

2

See, e.g., Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Utah App. 1991)(officer
described bloodshot, glassy eyes of DUI suspect); Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 997,
999 (Utah App.) (officer testified DUI suspect’s eyes were a “bloodshot, glassy color”),
cert. denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996).
5

which is not recognized in the NHTSA training manual as a symptom of alcohol use (R.
43-45).
Williams testified that when he approached Morris in his car, he smelled the odor
of alcohol (R. 11:7). He asked Morris if he had been drinking, to which Morris answered
no (R. 11:7). Trooper Williams then asked Morris to step out of the SUV and directed
him to the rear of the car, where they talked and the officer testified he could still smell
alcohol (R. 11:7). Apparently because the Trooper could not tell if the “slight whiff” of
alcohol was coming from Morris’s breath, Trooper Williams asked Morris to blow into
his hand (Video 21:36:38, R. 11:7). He testified that he smelled a “very strong” odor of
alcohol (R. 11:7). The Court should again refer to the videotape, which shows the officer
holding his palm to Morris’s mouth, having Morris blow on his open hand, and then
turning his hand through the air to smell his palm – a series of actions very unlikely to
capture, preserve or convey the smell of any odor on Morris’ breath. See video at
21:36:53.
Morris’s balance was fine, as the trooper noted on the DUI report form, and as the
videotape confirms (R. 28, videotape passim).
The trooper asked Morris to perform field sobriety tests, but before he did so, he
searched him by requiring Morris to identify the contents of his pockets as the officer
prodded them, and requiring him to remove a pocket knife and give it to the officer
during the tests (Video at 21:38:12-36).

6

Trooper Williams then had Morris perform the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test,
the Walk-and-Turn, the One-Leg Stand, and complete two portable breath tests (R. 11:8).
Morris passed the one leg stand test (PH 9). This appears to contrast with the “No
Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet” sworn to under oath by the officer, which indicates that
Morris failed the field sobriety tests (R. 29).
The trooper felt that Morris “failed” the HGN test (PH 8), but as the NHTSA
manual indicates, that test indicates many conditions and substances in addition to alcohol
consumption.
The trooper felt that Morris failed the walk and turn because he stepped off line
during the instructional phase, did not count out loud as he walked, raised his arms more
than six inches, took one too many steps and spun on the turn, rather than pivoting (PH
8). By reviewing the videotape, the Court may confirm that the test was performed where
there was no line for Morris to stand on or walk, and that the trooper’s instructions did
not clearly inform Morris that he was expected to keep his arms within six inches of his
legs, or that he was supposed to count out loud (Video 21:41-10-17). The portion of the
test wherein Morris supposedly took an extra step and turned improperly is not on film
(Video 21:40:53).
On the PBT test, Trooper Williams made Mr. Morris complete it twice because
during the first attempt, there was not a sufficient air sample (R. 11:26). The second test
was positive for alcohol (R. 11:9, 28). Before the second test, the trooper questioned
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Morris about where he lived and how long he had been there in between the PBTs,
extending the detention approximately 45 seconds. See video: 21:47:05.
The trooper testified at the preliminary hearing that Morris asked repeatedly or a
couple of times why the trooper stopped him and was conducting field sobriety tests (PH
9), implying that Morris was not tracking mentally. By reviewing the videotape, the
Court may confirm that Morris indicated one time during the field sobriety tests that he
did not really understand why the trooper had stopped him (video 21:43:17).
Trooper Williams placed Morris under arrest for driving under the influence of
alcohol (R. 11:9). After the arrest, the police found methamphetamine and open
containers of alcohol in the SUV, and later found a dollar bill bearing traces of
methamphetamine in Morris’s wallet (R. 11:12, 33, 35, 44).

THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
In its ruling, the trial court ruled that it was debatable whether Morris’ driving
pattern justified a traffic stop, but that the stop was justified because Morris’ temporary
permit did not meet the requirements of visibility, legibility, and illumination for license
plates (R. 67-68). The trial court relied on Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-404 (3) (requiring
license plates to be securely fastened, clearly visible, and clearly legible) and Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6a-1604 (2)(c) (requiring license plates to be illuminated with a tail lamp or
separate lamp) in ruling that Morris’ temporary tag did not comport with the law because
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Trooper Williams had to walk by the vehicle and spotlight the rear window in order to see
the temporary tag (R. 67-69). The court also ruled that under United States v. McSwain,
Trooper Williams was allowed to make contact with Morris, explain the basis for the
stop, and release him (R. 69). The trial court found that the brief initial encounter
generated reasonable suspicion that Morris was driving under the influence because
Trooper Williams’s first contact with Morris generated a whiff of an alcoholic beverage,
which eventually led to a DUI investigation and arrest (R. 69). The court did not address
whether Trooper Williams’ request for Morris’ license and registration exceeded the
scope of the stop.
Without a discussion of the governing law, the trial court classified the search of
Morris’ pockets as a frisk and found it was justified by Morris’s size, because the trooper
was outnumbered by Morris and his female passenger, because Morris put his hands in
his pockets repeatedly, and because the stop occurred 14 miles from Moab on a rural
highway (R. 69-70). The trial court did not address whether the frisk was actually a
search which elevated the detention into a de facto arrest.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The traffic stop was not justified in its inception. The temporary permit on the
back of the SUV was proper, as was Morris’ driving pattern. The trial court’s ruling
affirming the stop on the theory that the temporary permit should have been illuminated,
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visible, and legible, was legally erroneous because the statutes the court relied on apply
specifically to license plates. The temporary permit was in full compliance with the
specific statute applicable to temporary permits. Because the stop was unlawful in its
inception, all resultant evidence is subject to suppression.
Assuming arguendo that the stop were initially justified by the trooper’s initial
inability to see the temporary permit, he spotlighted the permit before he got out of his
car. Thus, there was no lawful basis for an extended detention. All evidence stemming
from the unlawful detention must be suppressed.
Assuming that there were a lawful basis for the stop and the extended detention,
in searching Morris prior to the DUI investigation, the trooper transformed the detention
into a de facto arrest, which was lacking in probable cause. Accordingly, the trial court
erred in denying the motion to suppress.
This Court should reverse the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and
remand this matter to the trial court for withdrawal of Morris’ conditional pleas.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNLAWFUL IN ITS
INCEPTION.

While Fourth Amendment analysis seems adequate to resolve the issues before this
Court in the instant case, Morris also relies on Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution,
which provides protection which is at least co-extensive with the federal counterpart, in
10

forbidding “sweeping, dragnet-type detentions of ordinary people engaged in peaceful,
ordinary activities. Under both constitutions, the general rule is that ‘specific and
articulable facts... taken together with rational inferences from those facts, [must]
reasonably warrant’ the particular intrusion.’” State v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah
2000)(citations omitted); see also id., 996 P.2d at 552 (recognizing that Article I § 14 and
numerous provisions of the Utah Declaration of Rights, consistent with the history of the
founders of this State, are concerned with “all purpose criminal investigation without
individualized suspicion.”).
“The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the ‘right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.’” United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989).
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure that is subject to judicial scrutiny under the
Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir. 1991).
The government has the burden to justify the traffic stop, both in its inception and in its
scope.

See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994).

A.

THE TEMPORARY PERMIT WAS PROPER AND DID
NOT JUSTIFY THE STOP.

“[A]n officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is
incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer’s presence.” Lopez, supra (internal
quotations and citations omitted). The lack of registration on Morris’ SUV is also not a
11

basis for the stop, for, as Trooper Williams testified, as he was walking to Morris’s car,
he saw a temporary sticker in the upper left hand corner of the back window that was
previously not visible (PH at 7, 19). The videotape actually demonstrates that it was
before the trooper ever stopped driving that he spotlighted the registration tag in the upper
rear window on the back of the SUV (Video: 21:34:25). He did not cite Morris for any
impropriety with the plate.
As soon as the officer saw the proper registration, the basis for the detention
ended, and the detention should have ended as well. See, e.g., United States v. McSwain,
29 F.3d 558, 561 (10 th Cir. 1994)(suppressing fruits of traffic stop prompted by concern
that temporary registration was invalid, which concern was dispelled immediately after
stop began, when trooper saw that temporary registration was proper).
The trial court’s alternative basis for approving of the stop was that the temporary
permit was out of compliance with two statutes: Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1a-404(3)(a)(iii)
and (b)(ii) and 41-6a-1604(2)(c) (R. 68). By reviewing the two statutes, this Court may
confirm that they apply to license plates. Section 41-1a-404 provides, relevant part:
(3) Every license plate shall at all times be:
(a) securely fastened:
....
(iii) in a place and position to be clearly visible; and
(b) maintained:
....
(ii) in a condition to be clearly legible.
...
12

Section 41-6a-1604 provides, in relevant part:
....
(2)
....
(c) Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be so
constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the
rear registration plate.
Both of the foregoing statutes expressly refer to “license plates.” Temporary
permits such as was affixed to Morris’ mother’s SUV, are distinguished from license
plates by out legislature and governed by separate statutes. For instance, in contrast to the
license plate statutes relied on by the trial court, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-211 only
requires that temporary permits be displayed. It provides:
(1)(a) The division may grant a temporary permit to operate a
vehicle for which:
(i) application for
registration has been made, or, in
the case of a newly purchased
vehicle, will be made;
(ii) evidence of ownership is provided;
and
(iii) the proper fees have been paid.
(b) The temporary permit allows the vehicle to be
operated pending complete registration by displaying:
(i) the temporary permit; or
(ii) other evidence of the
application under rules made by
the commission.
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(2) If a vehicle is operated on a temporary permit issued under this
section or Section 41-3-302,[ 3 ] that vehicle is subject to all other statutes,
rules, and regulations intended to control the use and operation of vehicles
on the highways.
Under the structure of the Utah Constitution, it is the exclusive function of the
legislature to draft and enact laws, not the courts’. See Constitution of Utah, Article VI §
1 and Article V § 1. The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers logically requires
the Court’s fealty to the plain language enacted by the legislature.
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a statute is
based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The courts
owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a legislature says in the text
of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the
legislature.

3

Section 41-3-302 provides:
(1)(a)(i) A dealer or the division may issue a temporary permit.
(ii) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the administrator shall makes
rules for the issuance of a temporary permit under Subsection
(1)(a)(i).
(iii) The division shall furnish the forms for temporary
permits issued by dealers under Subsection (1)(a)(i).
(b) A dealer may issue a temporary permit to a bona fide purchaser of a
motor vehicle for a period not to exceed 45 days on a motor vehicle sold to the
purchaser by the dealer.
(c) The dealer is responsible and liable for the registration fee of each
motor vehicle for which the permit is issued.
(d) All issued temporary permits that are outstanding after 45 days from
the date they are issued are delinquent and a penalty equal to the registration fee
shall be collected from the issuing dealer.
(2) If a temporary permit is issued by a dealer under this section and the sale of the
motor vehicle is subsequently rescinded, the temporary permit may be voided and
the issuing dealer is not liable for the registration fee or penalty.
14

Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46.03.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of
the legislature. The primary tools for the determination of the intent of the legislature are
reading and giving effect to the plain language enacted by the legislature. “The doctrine
is fundamental…that in arriving at the intention of the Legislature the courts must give
effect to the plain meaning of the language used to express the intention…. The plain and
obvious meaning of the language must be adopted; anything else would be an
unwarranted assumption of legislative authority.” State v. Davis 184 P. 161, 165 (Utah
1919).
The fact that the legislature did not mention temporary permits in the license plate
statutes relied on by the trial court, but instead mentioned the specific phrase “temporary
permit” in other statutes and required only that the permits be displayed, e.g., § 41-1a211, demonstrates that the legislature did not intend for the temporary permits to be
required to meet the same placement and illumination requirements as licenses plates.
See, e.g., Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998) (recognizing the maxim of
statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” which means the expression
of one thing implies the exclusion of another); Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658 P.2d 1216, 1217
(Utah 1983) (“It probably is not wholly inaccurate to suppose that ordinarily when people
say one thing they do not mean something else.”) (quoting 2a C. Sands, Sutherland
Statutory Construction, § 47.01 (4 th ed. 1973)).
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Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the traffic stop
was justified on the theory that the temporary permit failed to comport with the license
plate statutes. Because there was no lawful basis for the inception of the stop and
detention, suppression of all resultant evidence is in order. See Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043,
supra.

B.

THE LAWFUL DRIVING PATTERN DID
NOT JUSTIFY THE STOP.

“[A]n officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is
incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer’s presence.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-710 only requires drivers to
operate their vehicles “as nearly as practical” within a single lane. State v. Bello, 871
P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).4 If following a
“perfect vector” within one’s lane were required by the law, “a substantial portion of the
public would be subject each day to an invasion of their privacy.” State v. Fanari, No.
981108-CA, 1998 WL 1758329 (Utah Ct. App. Dec.9, 1998) (quoting United States v.

4

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61 was renumbered as Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-710.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-710(1) provides:
(1) A person operating a vehicle:
(a) shall keep the vehicle as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane;
and
(b) may not move the vehicle from the lane until the operator has
determined the movement can be made safely.
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Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1993). Further, in order for an officer to have probable
cause to stop a driver for driving under the influence, the driver must weave beyond his
lane more than once. Bello, 871 P.2d at 587 (holding that driver’s crossing the center line
one time did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of DUI); stating that “a single instance
of weaving...cannot serve as the constitutional basis for stopping” a driver for suspicion
of criminal activity); see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-502; see Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043
(stating that a traffic stop is lawful if it is based on “probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the
influence of alcohol...”).
The Utah statute, § 41-6a-710(1), requires both that the driver operate the car as
nearly as practical within a single lane of traffic and that the driver not move the vehicle
from the lane until the operator has determined that the movement can be made safely.
The plain text of this statutory language requires proof of two elements – failing to stay
within a lane and unsafe movement by the driver. See n.2, supra. This statute does not
create two separate offenses, but rather only one: moving out of a marked lane when it is
not safe to do so. See Rowe v. State, 769 A.2d at 879, 886-87 (Md. 2001) (interpreting
parallel Maryland statute); Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. App. 1998)
(interpreting parallel Texas statute).
In the instant matter, Morris stayed within his lane, despite the fact that he was
driving a tall SUV with a low rear tire and materials strapped on top, on a curvy rutted
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road. He properly pulled away from oncoming traffic, but stayed within the lane markers,
and endangered no one. See Videotape and Statement of Facts, supra.
This Court may confirm the absence of a lawful basis for the officer’s stop of
Morris by reviewing United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10 th Cir. 1996), which held
that a driver’s passing over into the emergency lane and then back into traffic did not
establish a violation of 41-6a-710 (1). The court explained as follows:
[T]he statute requires only that the vehicle remain entirely in a single lane
“as nearly as practical.” Id. The road was winding, the terrain mountainous
and the weather condition was windy. Under these conditions any vehicle
could be subject to an isolated incident of moving into the right shoulder of
the roadway, without giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity. The
driver may have decided to pull over to check his vehicle and then have a
sudden change of mind and pulled back into the traffic lane. Since the
movement of the vehicle occurred toward the right shoulder, other traffic
was in no danger of collision. These facts lead us to conclude that the single
occurrence of moving to the right shoulder of the roadway which was
observed by Officer Barney could not constitute a violation of Utah law and
therefore does not warrant the invasion of Fourth Amendment.
Gregory, 79 F.3d at 978. In concluding that there was no violation of the traffic statute,
the Gregory court cited State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 883 P.2d.
1359 (1994), wherein this Court likewise emphasized the statutory language requiring
drivers to keep their cars within the lane markers “as nearly as practical” to find that a
driver’s one instance of weaving did not justify a traffic stop under the same statute as is
at issue here (albeit it was numbered differently at that time). Because it was windy, the
driver had a shell on his camper that was catching the wind, and the officer followed that
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driver without noticing any other driving violations for some two miles, the court of
appeals found that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 587.
Bello and Gregory are consistent with decisions from around the country wherein
the courts have rebuffed law enforcement efforts to justify traffic stops on the basis of
driving patterns wherein drivers briefly cross white or yellow lines. See United States v.
Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6 th Cir. 2000) (an isolated incident of car’s temporarily crossing
the white line separating the emergency lane from the right-hand traffic lane was not a
violation of law); United States v. Ochoa, 4 F.Supp.2d 1007 (D.Kan. 1998) (an incident
wherein car crossed lane marker onto shoulder one time did not constitute a violation of
the law); United States v. Gastellum, 927 F.Supp. 1386 (D. Colo. 1996) (car’s weaving
one to three feet over right-hand shoulder white line was not a violation of the law);
Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App. 1998) (car’s briefly driving into adjacent
traffic lane and back was not a violation of the law); State v. Lafferty, 967 P.2d 363
(Mont. 1998) (car’s crossing fog line twice and driving on the fog line not a violation of
the law); State v. Tarvin, 972 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App. 1998) (car’s drifting over solid
white line on right hand side of road two or three times was not a violation of the law);
Crooks v. State, 710 So.2d 1041 (Fla. App. 1998) (car’s driving over the right-hand line
on the edge of the road was not a violation of the law).
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Other federal courts have found a violation of the statute under much different
circumstances than the ones presented in Morris’ case. See United States v. Alvarado,
430 F.3d 1305 (10 th Cir. 2005) (vehicle crossed one foot over fog line absent of any
weather conditions, road features, or other circumstances that could have interfered with
operation of vehicle); United States v. Ivey, 313 F.Supp.2d 1242 (D.Utah 2004) (officer
saw defendant's vehicle swerve and weave and cross center line approximately five
times); United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444 (10 th Cir. 1995) (officer observed
defendants' car drift twice out of their lane of travel and into emergency lane for
approximately 200 feet); United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10 th Cir. 1995)
(vehicle was being driven well below posted speed limit and straddling the lane).
Here, Trooper Williams’ stop of the SUV was not “justified at its inception.”
Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043. Morris did not commit a traffic offense prior to being stopped.
While his car did not follow a “perfect vector,” the law does not require him to do so.
Bello, 871 P.2d at 587. He remained in the single lane “as nearly as practical,” given the
road conditions. His driving pattern endangered no one, and in driving toward the fog
line when oncoming traffic approached, Morris took the safe and appropriate course of
action. On these facts, Mr. Morris did not violate the law, and the traffic stop was not
justified in its inception. See, e.g., Bello and Rowe, supra.
Because the trooper’s action of stopping Morris was not justified in its inception,
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all evidence surrounding the traffic stop must be suppressed under basic Fourth
Amendment law. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 (1963).
Suppression is also a necessary consequence of the violation of Article I § 14. See
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990) (plurality) (recognizing privacy
interest in interior of car and adopting exclusionary rule as a necessary consequence of
Article I § 14 and noting that there are no recognized exceptions to this exclusionary
rule).5

II.

THE EXTENDED DETENTION WAS UNJUSTIFIED AND
CONSTITUTED A DE FACTO ARREST, WHICH WAS
UNSUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE.

In evaluating the treatment of Morris, this Court may wish to review basic
elements of search and seizure analysis, wherein there are three levels of police-citizen
encounters: a level one encounter, which is wholly consensual, and wherein the citizen
feels free to leave or disregard the officer; a level two detention, which occurs when a

5

The Larocco plurality opinion is often cited as controlling law in other opinions which
likewise recognize the mandatory nature of the Utah exclusionary rule. See, e.g., State v.
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-20 (Utah 1991) (majority of the court recognized privacy interest
in bank records under Article I § 14, held in accordance with Larocco that exclusion is a
necessary consequence of a violation of Article I § 14, and that no exceptions had been
recognized to the Utah exclusionary rule); State v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 2000)
(finding exclusion of illegal checkpoint stop to be a necessary consequence of Article I § 14).
See also State v. Ziegelman, 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1995) (finding that violation of
Fourth Amendment during traffic stop required suppression under Larocco); Sims v. Collection
Div. of Utah State Tax Div., 841 P.2d 6, 11-13 (Utah 1992)(plurality)(exclusionary rule of
Article I § 14 applies in civil proceedings which are criminal in effect and wherein it is necessary
to deter further illegal searches).
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reasonable person in the citizen’s circumstances would not feel free to leave or to
disregard the officer’s questions, and which requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
crime by the police; and a level three arrest, which involves intrusive questioning or
arrest, and requires probable cause. See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶¶ 34-36, 63
P.3d 650.
Level two seizures must be limited in their scope; an encounter involving more
that a brief stop, interrogation, and, under limited circumstances a brief check for
weapons, constitutes a de facto arrest, requiring probable cause. See, e.g., Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Officers conducting a lawful seizure must employ the
least intrusive means; when a reasonable person in the suspect’s place would believe
himself to be under arrest, a level two seizure has become a level three arrest, requiring
probable cause. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1973) (plurality).
Probable cause is established if the facts known to the officer and the fair inferences from
those facts would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the suspect had
committed a crime. State v Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983).

A.

NO DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED.

As explained above, the detention was illegal from the outset, because there was
no reasonable suspicion that Morris had committed any offense at the time of the stop.
The trial court ruled that despite the trooper’s realizing that the temporary permit was in
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order prior to approaching Morris, it was still appropriate for the trooper to contact
Morris, explain the basis for the stop, and then let Morris go (R. 69). In so ruling, the
trial court relied in dictum in United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10 th Cir.
1994), a case wherein a trooper stopped a car to check the temporary registration, found
that it was in order before approaching the driver, but nonetheless approached the driver,
took his registration and questioned him. The Tenth Circuit held that in so doing, the
trooper exceeded the scope of detention. Id. at 561. In dictum, the court mentioned that it
would be acceptable for an officer who had initiated a traffic stop and found it to be
baseless before speaking to the driver to approach the driver, explain why he made the
stop, and then release the driver before requesting documentation or questioning. Id. at
561.
This dictum should not be adopted by this Court, because it does not square with
fundamental Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14 jurisprudence requiring the police to
end seizures immediately after the legal basis for them dissipates. Under both
constitutions, the general rule is that ‘specific and articulable facts... taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, [must] reasonably warrant’ the particular intrusion.’”
State v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000)(citations omitted).
The video of the stop does not depict the trooper apologizing for his baseless stop,
but instead depicts him telling Morris that he stopped him for the temporary plate, which
the trooper was no longer concerned about, and Morris’ driving pattern. The trooper did
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not apologize or send him on his way, and when Morris asked him if he wanted his
license and registration, the trooper responded, “Yeah. All that.” (Video: 21:35:11).
Thus, the facts of this case are distinguishable from the dictum in McSwain in any event.
The trial court found that the trooper’s “first contact with Morris generated a
‘whiff’ of an alcoholic beverage, which eventually led to an arrest for DUI.” (R. 69). The
videotape and trooper testimony demonstrate that the trooper could not tell if the odor of
alcohol was emanating from Morris at least until after he required Morris to get out of the
SUV and blow into the trooper’s hand. Williams testified that when he approached
Morris in his car, he smelled the odor of alcohol (R. 11:7). He asked Morris if he had
been drinking, to which Morris answered no (R. 11:7). Trooper Williams then asked
Morris to step out of the SUV and directed him to the rear of the car, where they talked
and the officer testified he could still smell alcohol (R. 11:7). Apparently because the
Trooper could not tell if the “slight whiff” of alcohol was coming from Morris’s breath,
Trooper Williams asked Morris to blow into his hand (Video 21:36:38, R. 11:7).
Given that Morris was lucid, spoke clearly and did not clearly smell of alcohol,
there was no reason to believe that he might be driving under the influence, to justify
ordering him out of his car for an extended detention for a DUI investigation. Compare
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶¶ 2-3, 26, 164 P.3d 397 (officer had a reasonable
suspicion, but not probable cause of DUI, when he found the defendant with slurred, slow
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speech and bloodshot eyes, standing by his truck which smelled of alcohol, near a crushed
beer can, a recently emptied cooler, and a large wet spot in the road).
Assuming that the stop and initial detention were lawful, and that the trooper’s
detection of a “ slight whiff” of alcohol provided a reasonable suspicion to justify an
extended detention (Video 21:36:38, R. 11:7), certainly after Morris exited his car and
exhibited good balance, there was no probable cause to justify anything more than an
arrest. See Worwood at ¶ 35 (finding that the facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion did
not give rise to probable cause absent evidence that the defendant was unsteady in his
walking).

B.

THE UNLAWFUL SEARCH CONFIRMS
THAT THE DE FACTO ARREST REQUIRES
SUPPRESSION.

Assuming that a DUI investigation were in order, the Trooper did not proceed with
a DUI investigation, but instead began inquiring into whether Morris had anything in his
pockets that the trooper should know about, groping the contents of Morris’ pockets from
outside the fabric, requiring Morris to identify the contents of his pockets, and requiring
Morris to surrender his pocket knife until the field sobriety tests were complete (Video at
21:38:12-36). As is established herein, this course of conduct exceeded the permissible
scope of detention and converted the encounter between the trooper and Morris into a de
facto arrest.
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Our law has long recognized that when an officer questions whether a citizen is
armed, or conducts a Terry pat-down frisk for weapons, the government must justify these
Fourth Amendment intrusions by proof of a reasonable belief that the citizen is armed.
See, e.g., State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 266, ¶ 8, 74 P.3d 1176, cert. denied, 84 P.3d
239 (Utah 2004). Two factual bases may satisfy the government’s burden to justify a
Terry frisk: facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that a particular suspect is armed,
or the involvement of a crime which inherently implies the use of weapons. See, e.g.,
State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App. 101, ¶ 19, 68 P.3d 1043, cert. denied, 72 P.3d 685 (Utah
2003).
A Terry frisk is not a search for evidence, but must be limited in scope to a
patdown for weapons. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (“The sole justification
of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others
nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer.”); State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 13, 78 P.3d 590 (if Terry frisk goes beyond
detection of weapons, all fruits must be suppressed). To justify a warrantless search, the
government must establish both probable cause and an exception to the warrant
requirement. E.g., State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah App. 1990).
The trial court characterized the trooper’s conduct as “frisking,” (R. 69-70),
despite the fact that the conduct legally amounted to a search. See, e.g., Warren, supra.
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The trooper had no reason to believe that Morris posed a danger to him, and there was no
crime under investigation which implicitly might have involved weapons. Nonetheless,
the trooper asked Morris if he had anything in his pockets to be concerned about, groped
and prodded at the contents of the pockets through the fabric, required Morris to identify
the contents of his pockets, and required him to produce and temporarily surrender a
pocket knife (Video at 21:38:12-36). The trooper had no basis to inquire about or frisk
for weapons, and certainly had no probable cause or other lawful basis to conduct the
search he conducted on Morris. See, e.g., Terry and Warren, supra.
The trial court did not recognize that the “frisking” was actually a search, and
made no probable cause findings. Rather, he reasoned that the “frisking” was justified by
Morris’ size, Morris’ putting his hands in his pockets repeatedly, and the facts that the
trooper was outnumbered and the stop was fourteen miles outside of Moab “on a rural
highway.” (R. 69-70). The factors relied on by the trial court did not establish probable
cause that anything would be found in the search, see Menke, supra, and did not establish
a reasonable inference that Morris or Balsley was armed, or had been involved in a crime
which inherently implies the use of weapons, see, e.g., State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App.
101, ¶ 19, 68 P.3d 1043, cert. denied, 72 P.3d 685 (Utah 2003).
The trooper’s search of Morris converted the detention into a de facto arrest which
was lacking in probable cause. Compare, State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶¶ 27-33, 164
P.3d 397 (finding that officer with reasonable suspicion to detain for a DUI investigation
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conducted an unjustified de facto arrest in requiring the suspect to drive in the officer’s
car to a different location for field sobriety tests). See also Dunnaway and Royer, supra.
All resultant evidence should be suppressed. See Wong Sun, Worwood, DeBooy,
and Larocco, supra.
All evidence flowing from the trooper’s constitutional violations must be
suppressed. See, e.g., Larocco, Wong Sun, supra.

CONCLUSION
This Court should suppress all evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Respectfully submitted this 29th day of September, 2008.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

TRIAL COURT’S RULING DENYING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in:
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the
Legislature of the State of Utah; and
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).
(2)(a)(i) The legal voters of the State of Utah, in the numbers, under the
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for
adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by
statute; or
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a
two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to
be submitted to the voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the
law may take effect.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow,
limit, or prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking
wildlife shall be adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting.
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:

(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people
of the county, city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those
voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the
county, city, or town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by
statute, before the law or ordinance may take effect.

United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-211
(1)(a) The division may grant a temporary permit to operate a vehicle for which:
(i) application for registration has been made, or, in the case of a newly purchased
vehicle, will be made;

(ii) evidence of ownership is provided; and

(iii) the proper fees have been paid.

(b) The temporary permit allows the vehicle to be operated pending complete
registration by displaying:

(i) the temporary permit; or

(ii) other evidence of the application under rules made by the commission.

(2) If a vehicle is operated on a temporary permit issued under this section or Section
41-3-302, that vehicle is subject to all other statutes, rules, and regulations intended to
control the use and operation of vehicles on the highways.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-404
(1) License plates issued for a vehicle other than a motorcycle, trailer, or semitrailer shall
be attached to the vehicle, one in the front and the other in the rear.

(2) The license plate issued for a motorcycle, trailer, or semitrailer shall be attached to the
rear of the motorcycle, trailer, or semitrailer.

(3) Every license plate shall at all times be:

(a) securely fastened:

(i) in a horizontal position to the vehicle for which it is issued to prevent the plate
from swinging;

(ii) at a height of not less than 12 inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom
of the plate; and

(iii) in a place and position to be clearly visible; and

(b) maintained:

(i) free from foreign materials; and

(ii) in a condition to be clearly legible.

(4) Enforcement by a state or local law enforcement officer of the requirement under
Subsection (1) to attach a license plate to the front of a vehicle shall be only as a
secondary action when the vehicle has been detained for a suspected violation by any
person in the vehicle of Title 41, Motor Vehicles, other than the requirement under
Subsection (1) to attach a license plate to the front of the vehicle, or for another offense.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-302
(1)(a)(i) A dealer or the division may issue a temporary permit.

(ii) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act,
the administrator shall makes rules for the issuance of a temporary permit under
Subsection (1)(a)(i).

(iii) The division shall furnish the forms for temporary permits issued by dealers under
Subsection (1)(a)(i).

(b) A dealer may issue a temporary permit to a bona fide purchaser of a motor vehicle
for a period not to exceed 45 days on a motor vehicle sold to the purchaser by the
dealer.

(c) The dealer is responsible and liable for the registration fee of each motor vehicle for
which the permit is issued.

(d) All issued temporary permits that are outstanding after 45 days from the date they
are issued are delinquent and a penalty equal to the registration fee shall be collected
from the issuing dealer.

(2) If a temporary permit is issued by a dealer under this section and the sale of the motor
vehicle is subsequently rescinded, the temporary permit may be voided and the issuing
dealer is not liable for the registration fee or penalty.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-710

On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following
provisions apply:

(1) A person operating a vehicle:

(a) shall keep the vehicle as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane; and

(b) may not move the vehicle from the lane until the operator has determined the
movement can be made safely.

(2) On a roadway divided into three or more lanes and providing for two-way movement
of traffic, a person operating a vehicle may not drive in the center lane except:

(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the same direction, and
when the center lane is:

(i) clear of traffic within a safe distance; and

(ii) not a two-way left turn lane;

(b) in preparation of making or completing a left turn in compliance with Section
41-6a-801; or

(c) where the center lane is allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same direction
that the vehicle is proceeding as indicated by traffic-control devices.

(3)(a) A highway authority may erect traffic-control devices directing specified traffic to
use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a
particular direction regardless of the center of the roadway.

(b) An operator of a vehicle shall obey the directions of a traffic-control device erected
under Subsection (3)(a).
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604
(1) A motor vehicle shall be equipped with at least two head lamps with at least one on
each side of the front of the motor vehicle.

(2)(a) A motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, and any other vehicle which is
being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles, shall be equipped with at least two
tail lamps and two or more red reflectors mounted on the rear.

(b)(i) Except as provided under Subsections (2)(b)(ii), (2)(c), and Section 41-6a-1612,
all stop lamps or other lamps and reflectors mounted on the rear of a vehicle shall
display or reflect a red color.

(ii) A turn signal or hazard warning light may be red or yellow.

(c) Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to
illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate.

(3)(a) A motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole trailer shall be equipped with two or
more stop lamps and flashing turn signals.

(b) A supplemental stop lamp may be mounted on the rear of a vehicle, if the
supplemental stop lamp:

(i) emits a red light;

(ii) is mounted:

(A) and constructed so that no light emitted from the device, either direct or
reflected, is visible to the driver;

(B) not lower than 15 inches above the roadway; and

(C) on the vertical center line of the vehicle; and

(iii) is the size, design, and candle power that conforms to federal standards regulating
stop lamps.

(4)(a) Each head lamp, tail lamp, supplemental stop lamp, flashing turn lamp, other lamp,
or reflector required under this part shall comply with the requirements and limitations
established under Section 41-6a-1601.

(b) The department, by rules made under Section 41-6a-1601, may require trucks, buses,
motor homes, motor vehicles with truck-campers, trailers, semitrailers, and pole trailers
to have additional lamps and reflectors.

(5) The department, by rules made under Section 41-6a-1601, may allow:

(a) one tail lamp on any vehicle equipped with only one when it was made;

(b) one stop lamp on any vehicle equipped with only one when it was made; and

(c) passenger cars and trucks with a width less than 80 inches and manufactured or
assembled prior to January 1, 1953, need not be equipped with electric turn signal
lamps.

